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Abstract 
 
 
The catering theory of dividends proposed that corporate dividend policy is driven by 
prevailing investor demand for dividend payers, and that managers cater to investors by paying 
dividends when the dividend premium is high.  While earlier research found that the dividend 
premium is not driven by traditional clienteles derived from market imperfections such as taxes, 
transaction costs, or institutional investment constraints, we find empirical evidence that 
demographic clienteles are an important source of the time-varying demand for dividend payers. 
In particular, we find that, as consistent with the behavioural life-cycle theory and the marginal 
opinion theory of stock price, the dividend premium is positively driven by demographic clientele 
variation represented by changes in the proportion of the older population. Our results are robust 
when controlled for the factors of investor sentiment, signalling, agency costs and time trend. 
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Demographics, Dividend Clienteles and the Dividend 
Premium 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) proposed in their theory of dividend policy irrelevance that 
in a world of perfect information, full capital mobility, no taxes and no agency costs, the dividend 
policy of a company should have no impact on its value. However these assumptions rarely hold 
true in the real world. The catering theory of dividend policy (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) relaxes 
the assumption of market efficiency and proposed that managers cater to investors by paying 
dividends when investors put a stock price premium on payers, and by not paying dividends when 
investors prefer nonpayers. According to the catering theory, corporate dividend policy is 
therefore driven by prevailing investor demand for dividend payers which is represented by the 
dividend premium, defined as the log difference in the average market-to-book ratio of dividend 
payers to nonpayers. 
 
Empirical evidence has generally been supportive. Baker and Wurgler (2004b) studied 
US companies on the COMPUSTAT between the period of 1963 to 2000, and found that the 
“disappearing dividends” phenomena observed by Fama and French (2001) can be largely 
explained by the catering theory. Li and Lie (2006) found similar catering effects among US 
firms when they examined changes in corporate payout ratios to the market dividend premium, 
while Ferris, Sen and Yui (2006) extended the analysis to the UK where they concluded that a 
shift in catering incentives most likely drove the declining propensity to pay dividends over the 
sub-period of 1998-2002. 
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Despite strong empirical evidence of the importance of dividend premium as a 
determinant of dividend policy, there has been sparse research on the factors driving the dividend 
premium. Liu and Shan (2007) attempted to fill this gap by examining the relation of dividend 
premium to proxies of agency costs and signalling motivations, namely the differences in cash 
holdings and in future profitability between dividend payers and nonpayers respectively. Yet, 
their positive findings are viewed as inconclusive since their analysis is conducted without 
consideration for time trends which substantially affects their conclusions. In fact, the notion that 
the dividend premium reflects time-varying contracting problems is rejected by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) as being inconsistent with the observation of improving corporate governance 
and declining propensity of dividend payout in the 1960s. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a) also attempted to identify whether traditional dividend 
clienteles are the source of the time-varying demand for dividend payers. They were however 
unable to match up the dividend premium to any plausible proxies for clienteles. For example, 
when they included a tax control variable in their multivariate regression, they found that the 
added tax control variable did not appear to impact the dividend premium much, and thus rejected 
tax clientele as a driver of the dividend premium. They also rejected transaction costs clienteles as 
an explanation, while ruling out institutional investor clienteles because of the difficulty in 
reconciling the rise in institutional ownership since the 1980s with the time-varying pattern in the 
1960s. 
 
This paper investigates the effects of changes in demographic clienteles on the dividend 
premium. We hypothesise that in a world where stock prices are determined by marginal opinion 
(Williams, 1938; Smith, 1967) and dividend preferences of retail investors are influenced by 
behavioural life-cycle considerations (Thaler and Shefrin, 1988), demographic variations may 
induce changes in demographic clienteles that then drives the dividend premium. In particular, we 
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find strong empirical evidence that the dividend premium is positively related to changes in the 
proportion of the older-to-younger population. Our results are robust when controlled for the 
factors of investor sentiment, signalling, agency costs and time trend. 
 
This paper contributes to current literature by adding to the understanding of the drivers 
of the dividend premium through an examination of demographic clientele changes as a source of 
the time-varying demand for dividend payers. To our knowledge, there has not been any work 
done in this aspect. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the behavioural life-
cycle hypothesis and the marginal opinion theory of stock price, and introduces our hypothesis. 
Section 3 describes the data sample and the methodology pursued. The empirical findings are 
reported in Section 4, while robustness tests are conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. Demographic Clientele Variations and the Dividend Premium 
 
2.1 Behavioural Life-Cycle Theory and the Dividend Preferences of Older Investors 
 
 According to the behavioural life-cycle theory (Thaler and Shefrin, 1988), households 
treat components of their wealth as nonfungible. In particular, wealth is assumed to be broken 
into three mental accounts, namely current income, current assets and future income, with the 
temptation to spend being greatest for current income and least for future income. The 
behavioural life-cycle theory therefore hypothesises that in the later stage of a household’s life 
cycle when they reach retirement and begin to dis-save, the investor perception of the non-
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fungibility between dividends and capital gains should lead to a preference for dividend-paying 
stocks by older investors for consumption purposes. 
 
 Empirical evidence has generally been supportive. Graham and Kumar (2006) studied the 
stock holdings and trading behaviour of 77,995 households over the period of 1991-1996 and 
found that, compared to younger investors, older investors allocate a greater proportion of their 
equity portfolios to dividend paying stocks. This suggests that senior investors have a greater 
preference for dividends. 
 
2.2 Marginal Opinion Theory of Stock Price 
 
 Given the dividend preference of older investors, it is reasonable to conjecture that when 
the general population has a greater proportion of older people, then the greater degree of buying 
of dividend-paying stocks by these senior investors should lead to a high dividend premium. Such 
a conjecture however assumes that stock prices are determined by the opinion of the average 
investor. If share prices are instead determined by the marginal investor, then the implications are 
different. 
 
 The concept of marginal opinion as the determinant of stock prices was first raised by 
Williams (1938) and subsequently extended by Smith (1967). According to the marginal opinion 
theory, in a market comprising of a number of interested parties who each possess an opinion as 
to the worth of the stock, the price of the stock is not set by the majority, regardless of how 
overwhelming it is, but by the last owner. This means that marginal opinion will determine the 
market price. 
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 If the stock prices of dividend-paying and non-paying stocks are determined by the 
marginal investor rather than the average investor, then it means that rather than being related to 
the absolute demographic structure which reflects the average investor opinion, dividend 
premium should be related to changes in the demographic structure which proxies for the 
marginal investor opinion i.e. demographic clientele variation. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis of Dividend Premium and Changes in Demographic Clienteles 
 
We hypothesise that in a world where stock prices are determined by the marginal 
investor and where components of wealth are mentally treated as being non-fungible, the 
preference for dividend-paying stocks by older investors means that the dividend premium should 
be positively related to changes in the proportion of the older population, a proxy for the marginal 
investor opinion. In essence, the larger the increase in the proportion of the older population is, 
the greater the marginal investor preference for dividend-paying stocks and hence the higher the 
dividend premium. Our hypothesis is therefore that the time-varying demand for dividend payers 
is driven by variations in the demographic clienteles. 
 
 
3. Data Sample and Methodology 
 
 This section briefly discusses the data sources and the variables’ definitions. 
 
The dividend premium PD-ND is the difference between the logs of the value-weighted 
market-to-book ratios for dividend payers to nonpayers, and the data is downloaded from the 
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website of Jeffrey Wurgler2.  Following Graham and Kumar (2006), we use the older-to-younger 
ratio Old/Young, defined as the proportion of population aged above 65 to those aged under 45, as 
the variable representing the demographic structure. Demographic variation is therefore 
expressed as the annual change in the older-to-younger ratio dOld/Young 
 
dOld/Youngt = Old/Youngt - Old/Youngt-1    (1) 
 
We also employ an alternative measure of the demographic variation variable 
dConsumers/Savers defined as the annual change in the prime consumers-to-prime savers ratio in 
our robustness test, where prime consumers are persons aged above 65 while prime savers are 
persons aged from 45-65. The US population data used for the calculations of the two measures 
of demographic variations is downloaded from the US Census Bureau3 website.  
 
 In our other robustness checks, we include measures of investor sentiment, signalling and 
agency costs as control variables. Our chosen measure of investor sentiment is the closed-end 
fund discount CEFD which is the value-weighted discount on closed-end funds. Data for the 
variable is obtained from the website of Jeffrey Wurgler. Following Liu and Shan (2007), we also 
include measures of signalling and agency costs as control variables. The measure of signalling 
used is the profitability premium E/A which is defined as the difference between the natural logs 
of the value-weighted future returns-on-assets ratios for dividend payers to nonpayers, while the 
measure of agency costs is the cash premium Cash/A which is the difference between the natural 
logs of the value-weighted cash-to-asset ratios for dividend payers to nonpayers. Data for both 
variables are obtained from Liu and Shan (2007).  
 
                                                 
2
 Available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/. 
3
 Available at http://www.census.gov.  
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The time period employed in this study is from 1961 to 2007 which represents the period 
for which the data for dividend premium is available. Following the methodology of Liu and 
Shan (2007), we employ multivariate OLS regression to estimate the relation. The regression is 
expressed as 
 
PD-NDt = α0 + α1 dOld/Youngt + α2 CEFDt + α3 E/At+1 + α4 Cash/At-1 + α5t + εt  (2) 
 
where αi is the regression coefficient of explanatory variable i, and  
εt  is the random disturbance term. 
 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
 
 Figure 1 shows the time series plots of the value-weighted dividend premium and the 
demographic variation variable. It is observed that while both variables are not perfectly 
synchronous, they are visibly positively related to each other. Indeed it can be seen from the 
correlation matrix in Table 2 that the contemporaneous correlation between dividend premium 
and the demographic variation measures of annual change in older-to-younger ratio is 0.457 at 
5% significance level. 
 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dividend premium, the demographic 
variation variables as well as the control variables, while Table 2 shows their unit root test 
statistics and the correlation matrix. The unit root test employed here is the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992) which uses the null 
hypotheses of linear stationarity and trend stationarity respectively. It can be seen that for the 
demographic variation variables and the control variables, the unit root tests generally support the 
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null hypotheses of linear stationarity and trend stationarity. For the dividend premium variable, 
the KPSS tests appear to reject the notion of stationarity, a finding that is similar to with that of 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a). As they highlighted, there are theoretical reasons to expect the 
dividend premium to be stationary and not grow without bound. The practical message is 
therefore to also examine the robustness of the regression results to the inclusion of time trends.  
 
 The theoretical backing for and our econometric findings of stationarity properties 
possessed by the variables of dividend premium, demographic variation and the control variables 
supports the employment of ordinary least squares regression techniques to test our hypothesis. 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the OLS regressions of the value-weighted dividend premium against 
the annual change in older-to-younger ratio over the period of 1961 to 2007. It can be seen from 
our regression results that the annual change in the older-to-younger ratio is a positive and 
statistically-significant determinant of the dividend premium. This means that the dividend 
premium is high when the proportion of older population to younger population increases, while 
the premium is low when the proportion of older population to younger population falls. 
 
 Column 2 of Table 3 shows the multivariate regression with the inclusion of a time trend. 
It can be seen that the annual change in older-to-younger ratio continues to be positively related 
to the dividend premium at 1% significance level. The regression coefficient of the time trend is 
also highly significant at 1% level. Our results therefore support our hypothesis that the time-
varying demand for dividend payers is positively related to variations in the demographic 
structure and our findings are robust to the inclusion of time trend. 
 
 
5. Robustness Checks and Future Work 
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5.1 Alternative Definition of Demographic Variation Variable 
 
 While our measure of demographic structure is adopted from Graham and Kumar (2006), 
there are alternative definitions of the demographic structure used in other research. In their 
analysis of the effects of demographic structure on asset prices in Asia, Eskesen, Lueth, and Syed 
(2008) have defined the demographic structure as the ratio of prime consumers (aged 65+) to 
prime savers (aged 40-65). This definition of demographic structure is also used by Krueger 
(2004). 
 
 We have therefore adopted the definition of Eskesen, Lueth and Syed (2008) as an 
alternative definition of the demographic structure and calculated the equivalent demographic 
variation variable as the annual change in the prime consumers-to-prime savers ratio. 
 
Figure 2 shows the time series plots of the dividend premium to the annual change in the 
prime consumers-to-prime savers ratio. It can be seen that the two variables appear to be strongly 
positively related. In fact Table 2 shows that the correlation between them is 0.394 with 5% 
significance level. The result of the multivariate regression is shown in Column 3 of Table 3. It 
can be seen that the alternative definition of demographic variation remains an important 
determinant of the dividend premium at 1% significance level. Our earlier finding is therefore 
robust to the alternative definition of the demographic variation measure. 
 
5.2 Investor Sentiment 
 
 In trying to identify the drivers of the dividend premium, Baker and Wurgler (2004a) 
found initial support for a sentiment-based explanation. In particular, they compared the dividend 
premium to the closed-end fund discount, a measure of investor sentiment that is also favoured by 
 11
Zweig (1973) and Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), and concluded that their results provide 
affirmative support for a sentiment interpretation. 
 
We therefore include the closed-end fund discount as a control variable in our 
multivariate regression to investigate the possibility that the demographic variation measure is 
only serving as a proxy for investor sentiment. Column 4 of Table 3 shows the results. It can be 
seen that demographic variation remains an important determinant of dividend premium at 1% 
significance level even with the inclusion of investor sentiment as an additional explanatory 
variable. The closed-end fund discount variable is also positively correlated to dividend premium 
at 5% significance level, a finding that is consistent with the conclusion of Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a). 
 
5.3 Agency Costs and Signalling 
 
 While the idea of the dividend premium reflecting time-varying contracting problems is 
rejected by Baker and Wurgler (2004a), Liu and Shan (2007) found evidence that the dividend 
premium is higher when the need to mitigate the agency problem is greater. In particular, they 
examined the relation of dividend premium to proxy measures of signalling and agency costs, 
namely the profitability premium and the cash premium respectively. They found that the 
dividend premium is positively related to the difference in cash holdings at the beginning of the 
year between dividend payers and nonpayers, and is negatively related to the difference in future 
profitability between dividend payers and nonpayers. They interpret this as investors valuing 
dividend payers with a higher premium when dividend payers have more cash and fewer 
profitable future investment projects than nonpayers, and concluded that this is consistent with 
the agency costs theory of dividends. 
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 It is worth noting that in the correlation matrix in Table 2, the cash premium variable is 
highly negatively correlated to the time trend at -0.945 with 5% significance level. Given the lack 
of inclusion of a time trend in the analysis of Liu and Shan (2007), it is highly likely that their 
finding of the significance of the cash premium variable is only a reflection of the importance of 
the time trend, and that the cash premium variable only served as a proxy for the time trend in 
their regression. 
 
 While the conclusions of Liu and Shan (2007) are best viewed as inconclusive, we have 
nevertheless included the profitability premium and cash premium as control variables for 
completeness. Column 5 of Table 3 shows the regression of the dividend premium against the 
annual change in older-to-younger ratio, the profitability premium and the cash premium. It can 
be seen that demographic variation remains an important determinant of dividend premium at 
10% significance level while the cash premium variable is highly significant at 1% level. The 
profitability premium is not significant. 
 
 Column 6 of Table 6 shows the regression of the dividend premium against all the control 
variables including the time trend. Demographic variation is positively-related to dividend 
premium at 5% significance level while the closed-end fund discount is also significant at 1% 
level. The cash premium variable however loses its significance when a time trend is included, 
thus confirming our earlier suspicion that the cash premium variable is only a proxy for the time 
trend in the analysis of Liu and Shan (2007). 
 
 Our robustness checks have therefore shown that changes in the demographic clientele is 
an important determinant of the dividend premium even when controlled for investor sentiment, 
signalling, agency costs and time trend. 
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5.4 Future work 
  
 While not within the scope of the paper, we believe that following the conclusions of our 
paper establishing the link between the dividend premium and changes in demographic clienteles, 
future work can be focused on an investigation of how the effects of demographic clientele 
variations are translated to actual corporate dividend policy.  There is also the potential to explore 
the effects of demographic clientele changes on the stock performance of dividend-paying 
companies versus non-dividend-paying companies. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 The catering theory of dividends proposed that corporate dividend policy is driven by 
prevailing investor demand for dividend payers, and that managers cater to investors by paying 
dividends when the dividend premium is high.  While Baker and Wurgler (2004a) found that the 
dividend premium is not driven by traditional clienteles derived from market imperfections such 
as taxes, transaction costs, or institutional investment constraints, we hypothesise that changes in 
the demographic clientele can be an important source of the time-varying demand for dividend 
payers. In particular, we conduct multivariate regressions and find empirical evidence that 
demographic variation as represented by the annual change in the older-to-younger ratio is a 
significant determinant of the dividend premium. This is consistent with our hypothesis as well as 
the behavioural life-cycle hypothesis and the marginal opinion theory of stock price. Our findings 
are robust to the inclusion of control variables of investor sentiment, signalling, agency costs and 
time trend, and to alternative definitions of the demographic structure. 
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Figure 1: Time Series Plots of Dividend Premium and Annual Change in Older-to-Younger 
Ratio, 1961 - 2007 
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Figure 2: Time Series Plots of Dividend Premium and Annual Change in Prime Consumers-
to-Prime Savers Ratio, 1961 - 2007 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
  
Value-weighted 
dividend 
premium 
 
PD-ND 
Annual change 
in older-to-
younger ratio 
 
dOld/Young 
Ann chg in prime 
consumers-to-
prime savers ratio 
 
dConsumers/Savers 
Closed-end 
fund 
discount 
 
CEFD 
Profitability 
Premium 
 
E/A 
Cash 
Premium 
 
Cash/A 
Year 
 
t 
Mean   -4.79 0.41 0.08 8.64 50.67 -61.69 1984 
Standard deviation 18.26 1.63 0.62 7.23 36.75 75.60 13.71 
Maximum   31.23 2.76 1.08 23.53 239.55 88.67 2007 
Minimum   -44.43 -3.77 -1.10 -10.91 15.80 -188.97 1961 
Number of observations 47 47 47 47 43 43 47 
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Table 2: Unit Root Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  Unit Root Correlation matrix 
  
KPSS: Level 
stationarity 
KPSS: Trend 
stationarity PD-ND dOld/Young dConsumers/Savers CEFD E/A Cash/A t 
PD-ND 0.423* 0.189** 1.000 0.457** 0.394** 0.348** -0.081 0.535** -0.546** 
dOld/Young 0.293 0.107 0.457** 1.000 0.150 0.065 -0.030 0.500** -0.303** 
dConsumers/Savers 0.173 0.124 0.394** 0.150 1.000 0.261* -0.427** 0.748*** -0.664** 
CEFD 0.141 0.122* 0.348** 0.065 0.261* 1.000 -0.207 0.248 -0.054 
E/A 0.343 0.146* -0.081 -0.030 -0.427** -0.207 1.000 -0.450** 0.407** 
Cash/A 0.439* 0.105 0.535** 0.500** 0.748** 0.248 -0.450** 1.000 -0.945** 
t - - -0.546** -0.303** -0.664** -0.054 0.407** -0.945** 1.000 
Note: Significance levels: ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
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Table 3: Regressions of Dividend Premium against Annual Change in Older-to-Younger Ratio and 
Control Variables, 1961-2007 
 
Multivariate regressions of dividend premium against measures of demographic variation, investor sentiment, signalling, 
agency costs and time trend. 
 
PD-NDt = α0 + α1 dOld/Youngt + α2 CEFDt + α3 E/At+1 + α4 Cash/At-1 + α5t + εt 
 
The dividend premium PD-ND is the difference between the logs of the value-weighted market-to-book ratios for dividend 
payers to nonpayers, and is downloaded from the website of Jeffrey Wurgler. The demographic variation measures are 
given by dOld/Young and dConsumers/Savers which represent the annual change in older-to-younger ratio and the annual 
change in prime consumers-to-prime savers ratio respectively. Investor sentiment is represented by the closed-end fund 
discount CEFD which is obtained from the website of Jeffrey Wurgler. The profitability premium E/A is the difference 
between the natural logs of the value-weighted returns on assets ratios for dividend payers to nonpayers, while cash 
premium Cash/A is the difference between the natural logs of the value-weighted cash-to-asset ratios for dividend payers 
to nonpayers. Both variables are obtained from Liu and Shan (2007). t represents the year. 
 
    Column 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Value-weighted Dividend Premium PD-ND 
Explanatory Variables             
  dOld/Young 5.125*** 3.603*** - 4.892*** 3.208* 3.443** 
    (3.448) (2.606) - (3.480) (1.905) (2.226) 
  dConsumers/Savers - - 11.555*** - - - 
    - - (2.883) - - - 
  CEFD - - - 0.809** - 1.042*** 
    - - - (2.553) - (3.112) 
  E/A - - - - 0.066 0.081 
    - - - - (0.894) (1.202) 
  Cash/A - - - - 0.110*** -0.051 
    - - - - (2.668) (-0.492) 
  t - -0.597*** - - - -0.870 
    - (-3.637) - - - (-1.506) 
  Constant -6.882*** 1179.046*** -5.692** -13.770*** -2.173 1702.75 
    (-2.785) (3.616) (-2.282) (-3.861) (-0.532) (1.495) 
                
R-squared 0.209 0.392 0.156 0.311 0.377 0.507 
Observations 47 47 47 47 43 43 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
 
